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This study was conducted in October-November 1976 for INTERTECT as one 
part of a series of case studies, interviews and reports being prepared for 
the United Nations Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO) to help determine the role 
and effect of emergency shelter following disasters. San Andres Itzapa was 
selected for the study because of the intensive reconstruction aid which it 
received. The Canadian Government spent nearly two million dollars on the town 
first aiding with machinery for rubble clearance, then providing materials and 
organizing for the construction of 1,600 semi-permanent houses and eight school 
all within a few months of the earthquakes of February 4, 1976.
The purpose of this study is to determine the attitudes of the local in­
habitants towards intensive housing reconstruction aid and to assess the aid's 
impact on the community.
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SAN ANDRES ITZAPA, GUATEMALA:
THE IMPACT OF A HIGH-AID HOUSING PROGRAM
Sociological Background
San Andres Itzapa is a municipio (municipality) in the Department of 
Chimaltenango approximately 55 kilometers from Guatemala's capital city.
In its urban center, San Andres had a population (before the earthquake) of 
5,916; another 2,531 lived in the eight aldeas, or villages, which dot the 
surrounding hillsides; thus making a total of 8,447. One hundred and fifty 
were killed in the earthquake of February, 1976.
The aldeas, many of which are accessible only by jeep or on foot, are 
inhabited almost exclusively by subsistence farmers called naturales, their 
own term for people of direct Mayan descent. The average income for such 
farmers in the Guatemalan highlands has been calculated at $150 a year . 1
The large majority (2/3) of the inhabitants of the municipio are also 
aaturales who work in agriculture at the subsistence level. A high percen­
tage of the urban naturales (specific data unavailable) are reported to be 
landless peasants, earning their living by renting land from large landowners 
or working on the large farms as agricultural laborers. Both rural and urban 
naturales customarily migrate to coastal plantations (of coffee, cotton, sugar 
cane) for one to four months every year to earn a significant part of their 
yearly income.
The ethnic minority in San Andres is constituted of ladinos, i.e. those 
who distinguish themselves from the naturales by speaking only Spanish (the 
naturales still speak Cakchiquel as a first languate). In general, the 
l£dinos are more rich and powerful than the naturales; they own most of the 
land surrounding the town, own and operate most of the town's small busi­
nesses and, until 1976, occupied most of the town's political offices.
Prior to the earthquake, San Andres had no health facilities and only 
one school. The general condition of streets, roads, and municipal buildings 
was poor. The best conditions were found in the town's central district 
(where most of the ladinos live) which has electricity, running water and 
sewers, as well as the town's only paved (cobblestone) street.
Among the naturales of San Andres, there is a strong tradition of humil­
ity and acceptance of the status quo, reinforced by religion. However, there 
was a small movement prior to the earthquake oriented towards greater justice 
and social improvement. The evangelist groups, for example, whose membership 
is largely natural, have interpreted their religous mission as a struggle for 
education, economic improvement, and ethnic equality. At the same time, some 
of the town s Catholics have organized into "Basic Christian Communities" to 
propose similar goals. The communities (groups of 20-25 families) were organ­
ized some 2 1/2 years ago by the town's North American pastor. Their purpose 
is to evoke from their members a Christian committment towards the solution 
of community problems. The communities send delegates once a month to meetings 
o the Parish Council. About 71/2 percent of the town's population is re­
portedly involved in these communities.
1. Figures from El Quetzal agricultural cooperative, Chimaltenango 
Guatemala. ’
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Another example of the social change movement was a community improve­
ment committee called Ku Samaj Junan (Cakchiquel for "Let's Work Together"), 
which was formed in the mid-1960's after a group of 300 families received 
land in the canton (subdivision) of San Cristobal (see next section for 
details). By bringing its pressure on the national government, the group 
received financing for a $12,700 bridge which united two parts of their 
canton, plus running water in three central locations. The group also 
aided the neighborhood in obtaining registered titles for their new land.
Finally, the social change movement was manifested in a political group 
called the MLN Youth.2 Over the last two years, this group has put pressure 
on the ladino municipal government to be more responsive to community needs.
In 1976, their candidate for mayor —  who won and began his term in August —  
was a natural.
In summary, San Andres before the earthquake was a poor, ethnically- 
divided town making some initial steps towards organization and social change. 
The reconstruction aid which the town received —  and the disaster which 
prompted it —  must be analyzed in the context of this reality.
Previous Housing Patterns
A . Cultural Traditions
The traditional house design, once used by the naturales all over the 
Guatemalan highlands, used cana walls (stalks of sugar cane of corn), rough- 
kewn wood as cornerposts, and a straw roof supported by wood or bamboo. The 
house was usually one room, used for sleeping as well as a storageplace for 
corn and other agricultural products. In most cases, the open-fire kitchen 
was placed inside a smaller second hut apart from the first. Because of the 
light roofs and flexible walls, the traditional design was resistant to earth­
quakes .
Many of the people of the aldeas still used this design at the time of 
the earthquakes of February, 1976. However, most of the urban residents 
used a design introduced by the Spanish in the sixteenth century, with 
adobe walls and tile roofs.3 According to a local builder, people generally 
preferred this type of dwelling because it provided better insulation against 
the heat and cold; was not vulnerable to fire, rot, or destruction by ani­
mals (chickens and dogs eat the cana); and had a more permanent and respectable 
appearance.
Although historical data is incomplete, the rough outline derived from 
the study indicates that adobe-and-tile houses became available to the naturales 
only within the present century. This may be attributable to rising incomes 23
2. Ironically, the MLN (National Liberation Movement) is Guatemala's 
predominately ladino ruling party.
3. See question 3 in survey, Appendix 1.
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connected with the nations’s expanding export trade. Adobes and tiles were 
both locally produced in San Andres and sold at relatively low prices.
In the last decade, lamina corrugated metal sheets) had become available 
in San Andres, also at a low price, and had been used in the aldeas because 
of its ease in transport and installation. It had also been used in town, 
often as partial roofing for a kitchen or extra room.^
In the traditional pattern, new house construction was the responsibility 
of each individual family. New houses were built when a new family was formed. 
The bridegroom s father (or his mother or his in—laws, if they were wealthier) 
would grant the new couple a parcel of land on which to build their house.
The house would be built with the aid of relatives and/or a paid assistant.
In town, 3-5 adobe houses were often placed next to each other around 
ifrftsr court, making an extended family grouping. Adobe houses generally 
required the help of a paid albanil (literally a mason, but here refers to 
an experienced but unlicensed builder from the local community), who worked 
in conjunction with the owner and his relatives or friends.
In some cases, an old house would be rebuilt rather than building a new 
one. Two of the respondents in the October survey reported having built their 
houses a generation ago on top of an old foundation. The main cause for the 
decay of the previous houses was the rotting and weakening of the wood which 
held up the tile roof.
B . Economic Factors
The type of house built (i.e., cana-and-straw or adobe and tile) and the 
length of time between the family’s formation and initial construction, although 
guided by cultural traditions, was largely a function of the family's finan­
cial resources. If a new couple did not have financial assistance from rela­
tives, it would have had to save an estimated 2-3 years to afford a cana, wood- 
and-straw (or lamina) house, or 5-10 years for an adobe-and-tile house. 4 5 6 Worse, 
if the new couple had not inherited land, they might have no place to build. 
There was no credit available either for the purchase of land or for house con­
struction .
This problem was exhibited in the mid-1960's, when San Andres became 
overcrowded with families who had no land. The problem was alleviated with 
a land grant from the National Institute of Agrarian Transformation (INTA).
Some 300 families were authorized by INTA to move onto plots provided in this 
grant which now make up the subdivision (canton) of San Cristobal.
With a population growth rate of 2.4% annually, the demand for new 
housing has increased. Overcrowding again became a problem by early 1976.
The average number of inhabitants was 5.1 per dwelling, most of which were 
one-room only.  ^ An undetermined number of residents had migrated to the capi­
tal city, finding no place to live or work in San Andreas.
4. See question 3 in survey, Appendix 1 .
5. Based on approximated material prices and average incomes.
6 . No data on terms is available.
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In general, the individual family's approach was to build the best 
house they could afford, if they could afford one at all and had land on 
which to build. Most of the naturales had houses of only one room, often 
with the kitchen inside the room; those who had more money would have a 
separate hut for the kitchen and possibly two or three rooms in the house, 
dividing up children, parents, grandparents, etc.
There was also a variation in the amount of "finishing" done to a house. 
Most of the naturales had mud floors, bare adobe walls, no ceilings, and 
no glass windows. The ladinos, on the other hand, often had tile floors, 
plastered adobe walls, light wood ceilings, and finished doors and windows. 
The richest ladinos had cement—block houses, equipped with electricity and 
gas stoves.
In summary, house design and construction before the earthquake of 1976 
was an individual family affair, guided by cultural and economic factors. 
Given these guidelines, the most common structure in San Andres was adobe- 
and-tile.
The following sections will analyze the changes made in this pattern 
through the combined impacts of the disaster and reconstruction aid.
Impact of Earthquake and Early Community Response
A • New Factors in Housing Patterns
The first and strongest of a series of earthquakes occurred at 3:32
a.m. on February 4, 1976, destroying 90% of the structures in San Andres. 
One-hundred-and-fifty people were killed and 728 injured, mainly from falling 
adobes, tiles or wooden posts.
The disaster affected everyone in varying degrees, both ladinos and 
u '^3lss alike. The least affected were the very rich and very poor, the 
former because they had houses of sturdy concrete blocks, the latter because 
they had houses of flexible cane walls and light roofs. The hardest hit - 
the majority - were those who lived in adobe-and-tile structures in the urban 
center. Many of these houses collapsed in the narrow streets, closing all 
possible escape routes.
Besides the loss of family members, the survivors suffered an economic 
setback. Many lost what little money they had in the rubble, as well as the 
corn which had been recently stored as the year's food supply. Precious time 
which would otherwise be spent earning money in agricultural work would now 
have to be spent on reconstruction.
The continuing tremors added to the blow. Over 1,200 small earthquakes 
were registered by the nation's Meteorological Observatory within 30 days of 
February 4, at least two of which were strong enough to cause more destruction 
and injuries. The most religious inhabitants were convinced (and remain 
so, according to the survey) that God was punishing them for their sins. There 
was an atmosphere of apocalypse as many religious groups united their members 
to pray for forgiveness.
7. Astorias Montenegro and Gatica Trejo, Terremoto '76, Ediciones Po d .. 
Guatemala.
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Nearly 100% of the respondents in the October survey reported being 
"stunned" for one or two months following the earthquake of February 4.
No one was sure what was going to happen.
The earthquakes added the following new factors to the existing patterns 
of housing and community organization:
1. The most common design — adobe—and—tile — was no longer viable.
A common new solution or reevaluation of the traditional mode 
was needed.
2. All the houses were destroyed at the same time, along with the 
destruction of public buildings and the interruption of daily 
life in the community. If the goal was to return to normal,
a dimension of community effort would have to be added to the 
individual family approach.
o. The disaster affected both ladinos and naturales, meaning that 
they shared an increased need for resources related to housing 
(especially capital and materials), hence a common interest in 
fulfilling this need for the entire community.
B . Community Response
Despite the psychological shock to the residents and their lack of pre­
paration for the disaster, they responded fairly quickly and responsibly.
By the night of the first day, many had already put up some form of temporary 
shelter using sheets, nylon or canvas on top of or adjacent to their des­
troyed homes. The families did not leave their sites because everything 
they owned, including chairs, tools, corn chickens, pigs, etc., plus the 
site itself and the title thereto, lay within the rubble. They spent the 
first few days caring for the dead and injured, and salvaging what they could.
The traditional urban design of 3-4 houses grouped around an inner 
court proved to be valuable in setting up temporary shelter. Many families 
owned large canvases used for drying beans. These were placed over wooded 
posts in the inner courts to house the survivors of the extended family and, 
in some cases, a few orphan children from the neighborhood. Many suffered 
from the cold (nighttime temperatures in the highlands during February are 
generally in the range of 35—50 degrees Fahrenheit) and food was scarce, 
since much had been lost in the rubble and neither the shops nor the daily 
market were functioning.
Over the following weeks, the residents improved their temporary homes 
using whatever resources became available, especially lumber and lamina 
that was salvageable from the rubble. As the October survey revealed,^ 
several of the residents built temporary huts in the traditional rural style, 
with cana walls, wood cornerposts, and lamina roofs. However, there was
a great fear surrounding the use of adobe and tile, and many were 
afraid that anything they might put up would be shaken down again. In addition,
8 . One interviewee pointed out that most of the naturales were experienced 
in temporary shelter because they were often required to provide their 
own housing while they were working on the plantations. (G. Porras - 
see list of interviews, Appendix 2.)
9. See questions 4, Appendix 1.
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very few residents had the financial possibility to begin permanent reconstruc­
tion, even if they had known what to build. Judging from these realities, as 
presented by the respondents of the survey in October, individual families did 
not have at that time a solution to the problem of permanent reconstruction.
However, the community did show signs of a group response to common 
problems arising out of the earthquake. The mayor of San Andres (at that 
time a ladino) formed an emergency committee the first day with six other 
ladinos who were municipal officials or personal acquaintances. Each member 
was asked to help coordinate rescues, transportation of the injured to nearby 
hospitals (the closest was in the departmental capital, Chimaltenango, 5 kilo­
meters away), burial of the dead, and removal of rubble from the streets. At 
least one.committee member put his truck in service for transporting dead and 
injured.10
At the same time, one of the community development groups mentioned in 
the beginning section — the Catholic Basic Christian Communities - began 
working out a reconstruction plan through meetings of the Parish Council 
and contact with CARITAS, the National Catholic Relief Agency (receiving 
international donations). The Parish organized a gift of 2,000 laminas to 
widows in San Andres within a month of the earthquake and worked out a~long- 
range plan including the sale of lamina on credit and a model—house plan 
by which residents could learn asismic construction techniques.H
Many residents have since commented that San Andres was on its way to 
s°lvln§ its own problems and might have done so without outside aid (see 
section on attitudes below). However, there is now no way of knowing.
Within three days of the earthquake, emergency supplies (mainly food 
and clothing; later blankets, tents, nylon, and medicines) began to arrive 
m  San Andres by truck and helicopter. The emergency aid immediately became 
the focus of community attention.
In the first few dyas, a dispute arose over the compostion of the emer­
gency committee. Ku Samaj Junan, the Indianist pro-improvement committee 
mentioned in the first section, thought that they should be the ones to dis­
tribute goods in their canton rather than the ladinos on the mayor's commit­
tee^ A representative of the group went to see the town's priest (a North 
American) and told him that he had witnessed a hoarding of emergency supplies 
on the part of the emergency committee. The priest brought the matter up 
with the mayor, who agreed to reorganize the committee so as to make it more 
representative. Following a meeting of the Parish Council, four natural 
representatives were chosen for the new emergency committee, making them a 
majority on the mayor’s 7-member team. At the same time, the deputy-mayors 
from each of the town's five cantons were asked to form emergency sub-commit­
tees. The sub-committees told the women in their neighborhoods that they 
should line up on the soccer field according to their respective cantons to
10. He complains today that he has never been remunerated for the cost
of running his truck for nearly two weeks at the service of the town, 
despite the mayor's indications that the National Government had made 
funds available for such circumstances.
11. This plan was later cancelled when the Canadian Government decided to 
launch its reconstruction project. 12
12. The priest said later he had the support of CARE, one of the largest 
donors of emergency supplies to San Andreas.
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receive emergency supplies, 
the streets. At this point, 
plan.
The men were to begin clearing the rubble from 
the aideas were not included in any emergency
ver time, each of the four natural representatives on the Central Emer­
gency Committee resigned their posts. One of them stated in October^ that 
the close to the mayor had maintained control of distribution and
were stiH taking the best goods (the nicest clothes, the most useful foods
^emselves. Since the mayor was partisan to the ladinos, he said! 
nothing could be done. -------  ’
In short, there was still no solution to the dilemma presented by the 
earthquake -how to reconstruct safe, permanent houses for the entire com­
munity. Altnough a beginning in reconstruction was made, community efforts 
were focused immediately on the distribution of emergency aid.
Canadian International Development Agency Reconstruction Project
A Hanning the Aid - Initial Determinations
r T T, A Canadian Government responded to the Guatemalan disaster through
C.I.D.A., the Canadian International Development Agency. Its first action 
begun two days after the earthquake, was a million-dollar shipment of blankets 
powdered milk and medical equipment, destined for the entire affected area ’ 
(Nationwide the earthquake killed 27,000 and injured 78,000.) While this' 
project was being carried out, C.I.D.A.'s home office wa^ designing"Ptese
outlined"!Tng t0 t l^e C-I-D.A. Field Representative in Guatemala, 14 C.I.D.A 
J T s reconstruction program using the recommendations of Guatemala's 
Na ional Emergency Committee Canadian Embassy personnel in Guatemala a !  
w e e k !  b  investigator (who had been flown to Guatemala in the first
were a! ! : ! ! ! ! 6 ‘ ^  P^gram by mid-February
1 .
2 .
3.
The budget was to be approximately four-and-a-half million dollars.
! ! ! ! n d ° ! d PU,rchase lumber and other building materials in Canada and ship them to Guatemala.
c H d e !  h ! Uldibe concentrated in one or two towns and would in- 
lude rubble-clearing, reconstruction of houses and public build-_L.il.gS •
4. C.I.D.A. would try to finish the reconstruction of houses before 
the rainy season began in May (100 days after the earthquake).
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ! ! ! !  !  thC reconstruction program in Guatemala was the
s e v L !  p o !  ! : r! e aetlE: ! S! rC! r8e d 'Affairs . Reportedly, he himself visited 
P Die locations for the program considering them on the basis of *
A member of Ku Samaj _Junan see list of interviews, Appendix 2.
1A. See list of interviews, Appendix 2.
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the following criteria:
1. Size should be right for the budget.
2. Area should be accessible to trucks.
3. Inhabitants should demonstrate a willingness to organize 
themselves.
The Charge d'Affairs apparently decided on San Andres after having 
seen rubble-clearing crews in operation and having talked with the presi­
dent of the Emergency Committee. 15 However, most of the townspeople sur­
veyed in October said they never knew why their town was chosen.
The Charge d ’Affairs had also reacted favorably to another, somewhat 
smaller town in the same Department (Chimaltenango), San Jose' Poaquil. On 
February 24, he signed an "Act of Commitment" with the National Emergency 
Committee, promising to aid both towns with reconstruction.
B . Organization of the Community
While details of the housing reconstruction plan for both towns were 
still being worked out, the Embassy deployed some heavy machinery to San 
Andres (12 trucks, 6 front-end loaders, one bulldozer) to begin clearing 
the rubble from the streets. The machinery was put to work on the 29th 
of February, while daily tremors still shook the town.
At this point, no official announcement had yet been made to the town's 
population that the Canadians were planning to reconstruct the entire town. 
Respondents in the October survey reported that they had heard that the Cana­
dians were financing the rubble-clearing, but they were unsure about the 
foreigners' motives; in the first few days, they had been afraid that the 
Canadians were going to move them out of town and steal their land. One 
hundred Red Cross tents had been put up in the soccer field, and many of 
the naturales had heard they were going to be sent to live there.
A group of Guatemalan university students played a significant role 
during this period in organizing and informing the townspeople about the 
Canadians plan.1  ^ Members of the group had been in contact with the 
Canadian Embassy^in late February and had learned the latest details of
C.I.D.A.'s aid . 17 The students carried out the following activities:
First, they held a meeting in each of the five cantones, telling people
that:
1. They would not be removed from their land.
2. Boundary lines would still be respected after the bulldozing.
15. According to Plenty, a group that has since worked closely with 
the C.I.D.A. program. See list of interviews, Appendix 2.
16. Two students from the Department of Architecture of the University 
of San Carlos (Guatemala City), plus five students from other de­
partments, were helping with distribution of emergency supplies in 
February. In March, other students arrived including a group of 12 
from the School of History, which were the principal ones involved 
in the activity mentioned here. See Bucaro's Informe . . cited in 
bibliography, Appendix 5.
17. See list of interviews, Appendix 2.
3. The Canadians planned to import lumber to help the people with 
shelter.
4. They should organize themselves so that neither the ladino 
municipality nor the Canadians would be able to treat them 
unfairly.
After the meetings by canton, smaller meetings were held in each manzana 
(roughly, a square block). The people elected two representatives for each 
manzana, who in turn chose five amongst them to be the representatives in 
the canton subcommittee.
Once this organization was established, the rubble-clearing proceeded 
canton by canton in an order preestablished and agreed upon by the Central 
Emergency Committee and the subcommittees. The manzana representatives or­
ganized work crews for their block to work alongside the heavy machinery, 
salvaging wood and other valuables while the trucks carried off crumbled 
adobes and tiles.
The new community organization incorporated a large part of the popu­
lation in the rubble-clearing operation, informed them about the schedule and 
purpose of the operation, and introduced them to C.I.D.A's reconstruction 
plans. As a method of communication, it was a significant improvement on 
the deputy-mayors’ subcommittees, which were not democratically formed, had 
never met beyond their initial meetings, and were not well-known in the 
community.
However, despite the democratic fashion in which the organization was 
established, in reality it conformed more to the traditional pattern of 
ladino control and natural submission. As one of the members of the students' 
group later commented, the naturales were not accustomed to such a democratic 
process — when faced with a decision on who to elect, they often voted for 
a ladino, because it did not occur to them that a poor, uneducated natural 
could be a leader.
Nevertheless, many of the elected manzana representatives and the members 
of the canton subcommittees were naturales - but, as will be shown below, 
these positions were not significant posts in the administration of the pro­
ject:. The most important positions - the presidencies of the canton subcom­
mittees — were occupied by ladinos in four out of five cases. The one natural 
president eventually resigned, giving his post to a well-known ladino in his 
cnntori, because he was, in his own words, "threatened" by his ladino neighbors.
C . Decision-Making in Project Planning
The University students had now set the stage for C.I.D.A.'s re­
construction project. The same group from the School of History provided 
the Canadian Embassy with a list of the heads—of-household for 1,117 families 
who had lived in the town before the earthquake and were to receive housing 
materials under the Embassy's Plan.
At the same time, students from the School of Architecture were working 
on a design for the house. The Embassy had informed them that the lumber 
to be imported (in fact, it was already on its way) was in the form of press- 
wood and plywood sheets. Lamina roofing was also being imported as well as 
nails and tools. On this basis, the architecture students came up with a
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design which they said was drawn up in consideration of local culture and cli­
mate. Their design had two rooms, both considered as bedrooms, and a shed roof 
covering a corredor equal in size to the living space. The kitchen was to be 
placed apart in a separate structure to be built by the inhabitants themselves 
using salvaged materials.
The students presented their design in opposition to another one which 
had been submitted to the Embassy at their request by a Canadian former building 
contractor and crate-manufacturer. He had already built a model house in San 
Andres, assuming the houses would be built according to his design. The 
students criticized several aspects of the model, especially his plan for a 
flat roof. They pointed out that the Canadian had no experience with Guate­
mala's rainy season (May to November) and did not understand that a flat roof 
could not possibly stand up to the heavy precipitation in that season.
Eventually, the Embassy decided on a compromise plan weighted towards 
the students' design - the house would have a shed roof, with a slight slope. 
However, another argument was already in session over the method of distri­
buting the materials. Whereas the Canadians wanted to set up a pre-fabrica­
tion assembly plant using voluntary labor from the town, the students were in 
favor of distributing materials directly to each site, whereupon each family 
would cut and assemble its own house, guided by the design of the model house. 
The students had already proposed their plan in a letter to the Embassy Charge 
d Affairs in early March in which they commented on the disadvantages of "im­
posing a design on the population of San Andres. Among their points:
1. Many families still had foundations or other usable parts of 
their houses still standing. Rather than tearing these down 
to make way for a total house, it would be better to give them 
the materials outright so that they could build on top of their 
old structures.
2. Many of the sites did not have the necessary dimensions for the 
model house under consideration. It would be better for these 
families to receive the materials so they could make the houses 
according to the size of their plot.
The matter was left unresolved by the Embassy for some time, until 
the Charge d'Affairs asked the president of the Reconstruction Committee 
(the Emergency Committee had changed its name) to cast the decisive vote. 
Acting unilaterally, he suggested the assembly plant be set up and run for 
a Lrial period of two weeks; if there was not enough enthusiasm for the plan 
on the part of the townspeople, the plan should be dropped. A town meeting 
was called through the manzana representatives and the people were informed 
of the decision. They were told that they would all have to participate in 
the project if they wanted to receive a house; that houses would be given 
to all families who had lived in San Andres at the time of the earthquake 
and were on the Embassy's list; and that the town would be reconstructed 
car^ tor^  by canton in the same order as the rubble-clearing had gone. Resi­
dents would be called to work in the factory by the canton subcommittees,
and they would also be asked to prepare their sites for the delivery of the 
house.
The structure of decision-making in the project-planning process illus­
trated the power of the donating agency relative to the townspeople in deter­
mining the style of reconstruction in San Andres. Finding relatively few 
obstacles in their path, the officials of the Canadian Government proceeded 
according to their own conception of what the needs and possibilities were
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for the town's reconstruction. It assumed, for example, that:
1. The priority was housing.
2. The houses must be up before the rainy season began.
3. Pre-fabricated presswood houses were better than none.
4. A family would rather have a whole house than the materials 
with which to make one.
5. A family would rather work for the house than buy it, or have 
it given to them.
6 . There were no better alternatives.
Although some or all of these assumptions may have been valid, they 
were never tested on the community at large before it was too late to alter 
them.
The University students played an important role as nationals, in criti­
cizing and refinging the details of the plan, and in establishing an organi­
zation through which the townspeople could theoretically have some input in 
the implementation of the project. However, they too were foreigners to the 
town, had no previous experience there, and had thought very little about what 
king of reconstruction plan might be possible without the presence of Canadian 
aid .
On another level, the same was true of the ladino president of the Recon­
struction Committee. Though he lived in town amid the rubble like his natural 
neighbors, he stated in an interview in October18 that he didn't know how well 
the poor people would receive the plan for preassembly and delivery. He said 
he felt pressured by time (the materials were already arriving) and the Cana­
dian plan seemed reasonable enough to try. Alternatives beyond what the stu­
dents had suggested were not considered.
D . Issues in Project's Operation
The construction system was designed by two officially-designated Canadian 
volunteers and administered by a Guatemalan student of architecture named 
coordinator by the Embassy at the suggestion of the University's Coordinating 
Committee. It was highly organized from start to finish.
Basic materials were stored at the football field as they arrived by 
truck from the port. As they were needed, they were transferred to the factory, 
which was mounted in the Municipal Theater, a large concrete building which 
was not destroyed by the earthquake. The presswood sheets and pine studs were 
pre-cut with electric saws, placed in pre-set molds, nailed together and loaded 
onto trucks. The walls and roof would then be delivered to the sites, at a 
projected rate of 35 houses per day.
The factory and delivery process required approximately 120 workers per 
day m  three shifts. The manzana representative of the canton under construc­
tion were each to send a group of workers to the canton subcommittee president.
18. Carlos Cabrera - see list of interviews, Appendix 2.
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who in turn would assign them to various tasks in the factory or on delivery. 
None of the workers were to perform skilled tasks because the high turnover 
would make training wasteful. Such tasks (running saws, supervising, etc.) 
were the responsibility of various Canadian volunteers (more on this below).
The residents were to have prepared their site before the delivery by 
clearing and levelling the land and digging holes for the cornerposts. In 
order to make sure this was done correctly, technicians from INTECAP19 would 
supervise the sites. The technicians were also in charge of supervising the 
erection of the houses.
The house did not include doors and windows — these were the responsi­
bility of each owner. However, scrapwood was made available so that they 
might make their own. The project also gave three sacks of cement to each 
owner to be used on the cornerposts. At the end of the project, each family 
was to receive a legal document indicating its ownership of the materials do­
nated by C.I.D.A.
The construction began April 10 and continued beyond its trial period 
without any formal evaluation of its progress. The factory worked non-stop 
for two months at one time setting a record production of 40 houses per day.
In June, there was a celebration marking the completion of 1,200 houses in the 
first group.
The factory system had been a new cultural experience for the people 
of San Andres. Few, if any, of them had ever seen or worked in a mass produc­
tion ^ situation . Many have commented since that they were impressed with the 
ongoing activity (which continued after dark under bright electric lights run 
by the project’s generators) and the rapid pace of production.
According to one of the supervising volunteers, the delivery process 
was the most popular among the workers, because they were able to ride in 
the truck and see parts of their own town which they had rarely visited.
The workers reportedly also enjoyed contact with the various expatriate 
volunteers (mainly from Canada and the United States) who numbered about 
twenty at any given time during the first few weeks of the project. The 
factory was located near the central plaza where the buses arrive and depart; 
it was the source of constant attention from both townspeople and visitors from 
outside. All reports indicate that morale in general was high.
Generally speaking, the project did accomplish its goal of providing 
a house to every family, and having most of them up before the rainy season 
began.  ^ However, there were some shortcomings which must be taken into ac­
count in assessing the project’s impact on the community. These are described 
in the following pages:
1 * ^.litism in decision-making. Although the President of the Reconstruc­
tion Committee made the final decision on the method of distribution, he and his
19. Institute for Technical Improvement and Productivity - working 
under a formal agreement with the Canadian Embassy.
12
Committee ceased to play a role in decision-making once the project began.20 
No other community groups, including the reformist groups mentioned earlier in 
this paper, were represented in or carried official roles with the reconstruc­
tion project. Even the municipality had no official role, except for providing 
occasional bureaucratic services and cooperating with the Embassy on a land 
grant to 12 landless families.21 This left the Canadian Government's own 
personnel in complete control of the reconstruction project.
In the first few weeks, the officially-designated Canadian volunteers 
were present to see that the factory process was working smoothly. Eventually 
they left the supervision of internal factory operations up to the "Apostles 
of Infinite Love", a group of priests from Quebec with experience in carpen­
try. These were known to the Embassy and worked for the project under a ver­
bal contract.
The significant fact about these and other expatriate volunteers is that 
they were put in positions of power without the previous knowledge or consent 
of any members of the community.
The same was true of the project's coordinator. Although he may have been 
more culturally adapted to a leadership position in San Andres, he was still 
an outsider to the town, and a representative of the ladino ethnic group. By 
putting him in an administrative position without any checks or balances on 
the part of the community, C.I.D.A. was reinforcing its own elitism as master 
of the reconstruction process.
The community organization set up by the University students was theoreti­
cally a means of democratizing the reconstruction process. However, in actual 
practice, the elected officials of this organization acted more as labor 
contractors for the coordinator. The pattern as described by the "Apostles" 
was as follows: they (the Canadians) would indicate to the coordinator how
many workers were needed and for which jobs; he, in turn, would call on the 
canton presidents to find the required number of workers. In most cases, the 
manzana representatives were ignored as an authority; they participated only 
in listmaking or other menial tasks assigned to them by the canton presidents.
In essence, C.I.D.A. had set up its own hierarchy of decision-making in 
San Andres, bypassing all other previously-established mechanisms.
2• Inequalities in Distribution of Aid
As mentioned above, the original plan announced to the public was to 
reconstruct the town canton by canton, using labor from each to accomplish 
the task. Exceptions were those who rented, or lived with another family, 
or for any other reason did not live in a house of their own which was des- 201
20. He has since explained that his duties as Director and teacher at 
the school took priority since classes reopened at approximately 
the same time the project began.
21. The 12 families had been renters previous to the earthquake. The 
municipality granted them each a small plot of land on the eastern 
edge of town so that they could receive houses from C.I.D.A.
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troyed by the earthquake. These people were to receive their houses after 
all the rest were built.
The order was interrupted when North American volunteers in charge of 
distribution of houses decided to attend to the most remote areas of town 
first, because these areas had the poorest access roads and delivery would 
become difficult there after the rains began. As a result, some people 
received their houses before they had worked at all in the factory, while 
others had to wait a long time after they had worked for their houses to be 
delivered.
In view of the confused order, the project coordinator asked each canton 
president to provide workers from his canton at the same time, rather than 
waiting until their canton was being attended. This seemed to work well 
for the first phase, but caused problems from June to August when the second 
group of houses was being built. Many of the members of this group had al­
ready worked many days in the factory during the first phase and did not think 
it was fair they should have to work again to get their houses. As a conse­
quence, the project coordinator could not find enough volunteers during this 
period to keep the factory going. He eventually resorted to procuring paid 
workers.
The issue of how much work one needed to do in order to receive a house 
was never clearly defined. The Embassy's resolutions made public to the 
town in the beginning of the project merely stated that "priority in the 
reconstruction of houses will be given to those who help in construction work". 
This idea was presented to the public by the canton subcommittee presidents 
in more concrete terms; they used a guideline of twenty days for every able- 
bodied male who belonged to a family receiving a house. However, in practice, 
there was a wide variation in the amount of time that people worked.
For the respondents in the survey, the time in the factory varied from 
a few days to several weeks. Many claimed they had worked on the Canadian 
project for rubble-clearing to the close of the factory - a total of six 
months. At the same time, many of the wealthy ladinos in town did no work 
at all; they paid others to work in the factory in their place. There were 
also some cases in which a family sent relatives to work in their place or 
received permission not to work in the factory because they were too busy with 
agricultural work. Work did not guarantee priority in receiving a house.
There was also a shift away from the stipulation that a family that had 
not lived in San Andres at the time of the earthquake was not eligible for 
a house. The project coordinator listed over 250 requests for houses or housing 
materials, many of which were from people not on the original list of eligi­
ble families prepared by the University students. Many extra houses and mat­
erials were given away on the basis of these requests. Whatever their validity, 
a popular viewpoint among the respondents in the survey was that houses and 
materials went to ineligible families. There was at least one case in which 
a wealthy lading received more than one house and received extra materials which 
were then sold out of town.
These facts pointed out that, regardless of the Canadians' previously- 
stated ideology of equality, the ladinos were still getting more than their
22. See question 6 in survey, Appendix 1.
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share of the aid. This served to reinforce the existing tension between 
naturales and ladinos.
3* Limited help for the aldeas. While the destruction in the aldeas 
was not as serious as in the town itself, a number of the inhabitants reported- 
ly felt they too should be included in any plan for reconstruction promised 
to the whole of San Andres. C.I.D.A. did send some of its rubble-clearing 
machinery to the aldeas and later organized a plan to rebuild (or build for 
the first time, in some cases) a school in each of the eight aldeas. 23 4 How­
ever, there was no plan to aid the aldeas with houses or housing materials.
In July, a social worker convinced the Embassy to provide a limited num­
ber of materials (enough for walls but no roofs) to the inhabitants of the 
aldeas^  through local reconstruction committees which he had organized How­
ever, the delivery was made all at once, and many missed out on the donation 
because they were away working on the plantations. The study revealed many 
houses still without roofs in November of 1976.
Two issues were brought out by C.I.D.A.'s light approach to the aldeas.
For one thing, it reinforced the traditional neglect of these areas on the 
part of the municipality. The aldeas, as always, were seen as different 
remote, less important than the town center - this helped restimulate the 
jealousies between residents of the aldeas and the town.
ln addition, it demonstrated the degree of control still reserved by
C.I.D A. over its building materials. The people of San Andres understood 
rom the beginning that much of the wood stored on their football field 
was destined for San Jose Poaquil, the other town receiving C.I.D A aid 
However, throughout the course of the project, C.I.D.A. made several gifts to 
institutions and groups m  other communities, none of which were included in 
o.i.D.A. s act of commitment" with the National Government. C.I.D.A.'s 
claim that there wasn't enough material to help the aldeas of San Andres was
v W Unf ^  : \ V USt a .matter of Priorities. Clearly, C.I.D.A. had its own view of what these priorities were.
4 - £allure of the block project. Since presswood walls are especially 
vulnerable to rot when in contact with the humid earth, the original design 
envisioned a cement foundation for the posts and a one-meter high wall of 
terracement blocks surrounding the wood. The model house built by the Em­
bassy representative used these blocks, and the Embassy’s original intention 
had been to provide them for all the houses in the community.
Andres'J’D 'A \ PrMVldud 11 bl°Ck raachines with a supply of cement to San 
L  T  SarJ  3rch and 3 8r0up of men from the community began making
making°activity6 "ih388" 8 ^  ^  C° 3 - ° P « a t L e  around theS block-king acLivity The cooperative would be allowed to charge each family a
1 9 “  f°r the bl°cks, thereby having funds with which to pay the workers and
houses^ere geoingPupatlVe' ^  bl°CkS “°Uld ^  Pr°duCed continually as the
23. According to social worker Gonzalez. See list of interviews
24. Construction was in the hands of volunteer carpenters from 
communal farm organization from the United States.
, Appendix 
"Plenty", a
2.
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A Guatemalan with experience in cooperativism volunteered her services 
as an advisor to the group, who, according to reports by the project coordina­
tor, were enthusiastic about the project. However, as the production of houses 
began in mid—April, Embassy officials realized that the block, project could 
not produce blocks fast enough to keep up with the distribution of houses, 
and furthermore, it was costing much more than they had hoped. The Embassy 
therefore stopped supplying cement for the production of blocks, although they 
left the machines for the cooperative. In the opinion of the project coor­
dinator, the withdrawal of the cement supply caused the failure of the coopera- 
thereby frustrating those who had been involved with it. In addition, 
it disappointed the hopes of those who had learned that the blocks would 
be supplied along with the house.
5- Technical problems with the house design. A report by a Chilean 
architect (see bibliography) which was presented to the Canadian Embassy 
pointed out some technical problems with the house design used in San 
Andres. Mainly, it emphasized the problem of humidity, which could attack 
the house for the following reasons:
a. The slope of the roof was not steep enough for the amount of 
rain that falls during the wet season.
b. Without cement or block foundations, the wood could too easily 
come into contact with wet soil.
c. The galvanized roofing was placed directly on top of plywood, 
threatening to rot the wood through condensation.
d. The wood was not treated nor painted with water-resistant chemi­
cals .
Given the fact that most of the inhabitants do not have the economic 
means to solve these problems, the architect stated that "40-50% of the dwel­
lings should be considered temporary", that is, unsafe for habitation after 
two years.
Another danger mentioned was fire, especially acute since the houses were 
placed so close together. Others have commented on this danger, adding that 
it is complicated further by the fact that traditional cooking is done on an 
opern fire within the house, and that furthermore, there is no firefighting 
equipment in San Andres.
Some steps have already been taken by C.I.D.A. and local inhabitants 
to combat these problems. In one of the cantons, for instance, the inhabi­
tants turned their wooden roof panels upside-down, leaving only the studs in 
contact with the metal roofing above. This became a popular innovation, since 
it had the added advantages of increased insulation and an attractive flat 
ceiling. As for the paint, C.I.D.A. (as of mid-November) decided to fund the 
supply of water-resistant plaster for all the houses in both San Andres and 
San Jose Poaquil. A fire truck has also been committed to San Andres.
However, most of the inhabitants are still uniformed about the strengths 
and weaknesses of the structures they now own. For example, half of the res­
pondents in the October survey^ thought that their houses would last between
25. See question 8 in survey, Appendix 1.
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twenty and fifty years. In light of the findings presented above, it seems 
they are sadly mistaken.
In summary, the project in operation was not as democratic and just 
as it had set out to be; and there were serious limitations to the design 
of the house which were not communicated to the inhabitants.
Some of these shortcomings might have been resolved with more careful 
and experienced staff. In fact, reports from San Jose'Poaquil (the other 
Guatemalan town which received aid from C.I.D.A.) show that some lessons 
were learned about design and distribution from the experience in San Andres. 
However, in that town as well as in San Andres, the original limitations 
were set by C.I.D.A. before the towns were chosen. To review, these limita­
tions involved:
a. Size of budget (4 and 1/2 million for two towns)
b. Type of materials (wood)
c. Style of project (intensive)
d. Amount of time (as little as possible)
Without expanding one or more of these limitations, it is difficult to 
conceive how the project might have been much more democratic or more success­
ful m  providing safe, suitable, long-lasting dwellings for the inhabitants of 
San Andres. The size of the budget, for example, limited the block project 
to a mere beginning (unless priorities were changed instead). The decision 
to import presswood panels limited the design of the house. Decisions on the 
style of the project and the amount of time it should take both influenced 
the project s ability to be just and democratic.
C.I.D.A. had taken on a formidable task: the construction and delivery
of a house to every family in San Andres before the rainy season began.
With such a goal, there was not time and no real effort invested in establishing 
or supporting a secure, democratic system of decision-making. There were 
bound to be complications and deviations from the plan.
On balance, C.I.D.A. did a good job within the framework of its own 
preset limitations. At issue is the effect of imposing such limitations 
on the reconstruction of houses in San Andres.
Attitudes Towards the Project
A. Majority Attitudes
Tbe survey and interviews conducted in San Andres during October-November 
1976, attempted to probe the attitudes of the community's inhabitants towards 
the reconstruction aid they had received. Due to the illiteracy of the major­
ity of the population and their inexperience in articulating opinions in the 
form m  which they were solicited, explicit statements of reflected thought 
Wir\ d^fflCUlt t0 obtain- However, the study did provide some indicators 
which have made it possible to construct the following statements about the 
feelings of the inhabitants.
b didn t expect any help and were surprised to see it come. In 
t e survey of randomly-selected inhabitants (see Appendix 1), 12 out of 17
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answered that they did not trust the Canadians' promise of aid when they first 
heard about it. As others more knowledgeable about the community have pointed 
out, most of the gaturales can recall a long history of promises made by 
their representatives m  the National Government and others in positions of 
power, and very few of them have ever seen a promise come true. They fully 
intended to solve their problems on their own - as they have always done - 
and were shocked to see how much help they did actually receive.
They Part:i-cipated_ in the project because they thought it was necpssarv 
a h ^ jjT 13 --- 1
Thrpp Personally in the factory or having sent a family representative.
permission^ronlt-l-fa1  ^7  T  their Places> and one claimed to have obtainedpermission from the canton president not to work. None of the respondents
T  °fflClal role ln the project, nor did they indicate having volun-
gift f a l t L ^ W l f 1”16 than thSy thousht was necessary to qualify for the 
fbove) necessary time was not clearly explained, as was shown
,3 'j -They falt satisfied with the house's design because they felt 
|hey had no other alternative. 11 of the 17 respondents t ^ e  usingThe 
ouse with no alterations whatsoever at the time of the survey s o m e Y s
need d they received it. The same number were aware thlt the house
needed paint and "general care" in order for it to last. They explained that 
they had no money with which to make improvements. In general the res
r m 8 i : Y ?  r n r  t o u t  t h e  q u a i i t y  °f ^ i L t  r e -garded it as a gift, and felt that the gift could not be criticised All of 
, respondents felt that housing was their most urgent necessity following
w ereFgerar t : f y i ea r2 s q i adk e ’ T d  T  «  ^  they  had 3 —  -  Y r Y Y t L Tnf H ip n * indicated above, most of the respondents had a poor idea
to c t p L Y Y Y ^ Y L Y b ^ h Y t  8iyen -  —  “ •
the Canadian = i t i  Y Y  ^ o r i ^  U ^  “  ’
of°canfd Y  pr0ject.was totally faultless. Many spoke of the arrival Canadian aid as a religious pvpnt' — i . _ .
popular interpretation 26 Most Y  SP°ke “  Canada s heart" was anf •j , host seem to have been as surprised by the arrival
no h ”  ^  ca ^ s l  7 I t "  ^  bthS earthquake‘ yc themPi t  had no r a t i o n a ly , no cause —  i t  must have been preorda ined .
Embassy Charge^UffairsYms T Y  °f the respondents said they had seen the
in Spanish d f r e c t t y  to t h e T  7  °n e ° f  hiS V l s l t s  tG the to™ '  spoke 
such a high o f f i c i a l  s h o n d  v POpulatlon> and they were impressed that
were impr Y Y  b T t L  t n g Y Y  ^  Y  ^ u t Y T 3^   ^ ^
who, rightly or wrongly, were identified as off I c L Y 101^  eXpa“ late volunteers Canadian Government. entitled as official representatives of the
26. Signs saying "God Bless Canada" and the like were frequently seen o n  
walls and street corners during the October survey. T s m a U  
monument was built honoring Canada in August, and I larger one- 
usmg community funds - will be built in 1977 8
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5 * T.hey felt better off as a result of the project. As stated above 
the respondents unanimously felt that housing was their most urgent need 
after the earthquake. They needed shelter for themselves, their corn and 
their possessions. Although a few clarified that they would eventually have 
solved this problem on their own by building some kind of permanent structure 
most agreed that, had it not been for the C.I.D.A. aid, they would still have’ 
been living in makeshift shacks at the time ot the survey. Only one family
out of the 17 said they might have begun permanent reconstruction by that 
time.
B . Attitudes of Community Leaders
 ^ As indicated by answers to questions 10, 13, and 14, most of the respon­
dents were natural farmer-families not associated in any of the groups men­
tioned at the beginning of this paper as being active in social change.
Leaders from those groups and other have somewhat differing attitudes than 
the ones described above. These were revealed in the study through inter- 
views with^eleven community leaders (seven naturales and four ladinos).
The following are some recurring themes in their viewpoints:
t IllgZJ^Ig_£.ritical of the house design. The leaders generally agreed
viewed beforeTl dT V h ^  h°USeS needed PaintinS (they were inter-
a betler fn a ; 1  authorized paint for the houses of San Andres) and
had a U e a d H f d e  ^  P°StS WaS n0t enOUSh> • Some of themM  4  improvements on their own houses, such as cement flooring
jority of°the non“? V  ^  paintlnS ’ however, most agreed that a ma­rt Ly of the population could not afford to make such improvements In addi­
tion, one commented that the wood-and-lamina construction did not insujate as
woerseaSbecausforthe'dile C°mdl"ati°n they had known before the earthquake; worse, because of the danger of fire, the new homes could not be heated
might^slip and fall th°Ught that the roof was too heavy for the frame and 
nlfl r T  and. fa11 ln another earthquake. In general, the leaders seemed
f u l f i l l  o r t h e " e e d iV! di th: a s ° Ui " ' t h e t ‘ T  T  ^  U  3 C™ p l e t egency house". ’ he WOrds of one respondent, an "emer-
to™  could have been reconstructed by the local jn- 
been reconstructed in l O ^ l s  ve ^  lntervlewed stated that the town would have
for example said that * basic obstacle to reconstruction. The Mayor,
the municipality but then1 h ° A L T  ^  pr°8ram had been considered by
beyond the^inanc^al possibilities^* l)acause repayment of loans in itself was
his belief that the emergency commUtee ! i o m e r ^ f o r f
thrr L ei V o f 08uhis^ s f°Und finanClal *“ * « “ “  P°r
blame3|;heI!?iLi!rCerr!dd nk f tlaea ln rj^__dj^ri^utWn_ of aid, but didn ' t
M ^ i l T ^ k l d  on t ^  unevei distr f ^ m 11 7  1  ^  even tW° °f the
plaint was that, while thev u n d e r  1- 1 • 10u ° aid • bn general, their com-’ while they understood m  the beginning that the houses would
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be given equally to rich and poor on the basis of work, in fact they were 
distributed without regard for who worked or how much they worked. Wealthy 
people who hadn't worked at all sometimes got more than one house, whereas 
those who worked the hardest got no additional reward, and sometimes were 
even made to wait longer than others for their house. The only one who speci­
fically denied this pattern was a man considered to be the wealthiest in town- 
the owner of a bus company.27
However, several of the leaders stated their belief that these injustices 
were not known to the Canadian officials. The Embassy had left a ladino from 
Guatemala City as their official representative and as administrator for the 
project; three of the natural leaders thought that he had allowed the town's 
wealthy ladings to take advantage of the Canadians' charity. One even suggested 
that a Canadian coordinator might have done a better job. In general, the 
leaders believed that the reconstruction aid they had received was genuine 
charity on the part of the Canadian nation, and that the country's represen­
tatives at the Embassy in Guatemala had done their best to donate the resources 
fairly. In their view, it was only in the actual process of distribution - 
when Guatemalan ladinos took control - that injustices occurred.
4. They felt the community was better organized^ waa ucLLtr.j. uiganizea ana more aware of its 
possibilities than it was before the earthquake. Several of the leaders com­
mented on the good example" set by the Canadians and the positive effect of 
eir aving asked for an effort on the part of the community. One leader 
praised the university students for having "organized us" during the rubble­
clearing process and having reinforced the idea that the community itself 
would have to work hard if it wanted to reconstruct.
Many of the leaders had held official positions in the project and they 
eit a personal sense of accomplishment when the project was completed.28
thev fp?rW°r l h a r ^  5 °  enaouraSe “ d enlighten others about the project and they felt, on the whole, that they had succeeded.
For those involved in making long-term changes in the community, the spirit
oroiecrraVn°n ?ard r rk Seemed t0 haVS contlnued beyond the close of the, ■ r example, the new natural mayor is enthused about the activities 
of a Support Committee which he formed with representatives from each of the
ff s t t f t T ^  ? 6ig^  The Co^ittee - with assistance from a group
tnve t eS T  W°rk fr°m the UniTCrsity of San Carlos - is actively 
service T - S°aUti0nS t0 ^  problems as P°”  electricity, water and sewage 
(such as the r 3 roads • Other leaders involved in conscientization2?
as the schol tefh f r  f  k e Cath0lic Ref° ™ ist S ^ p ) or education (such
that k  V  , "  W°rk haS been adva"ced by the discoverythat the naturales can work together and accomplish impressive goals such as rubble-clearing and reconstruction T ve goals, such as
27.
28.
29.
F. Arenales see list of interviews, Appendix 2.
Especially as members of the canton subcommittees. Spp lief nf inter 
views, Appendix 2 . ---- ~  1 lnter
A term used by religious groups 
conditions and of possibilities to imply increased awareness of social for change.
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In contrast to the majority, the leaders seem to have been more aware 
of the problems of the project and, at the same time, more entusiastic about 
its consequences for social change.
In light of the majority attitudes presented above, the leaders' enthusi­
asm may be unfounded. Although the poorer naturales greatly appreciated the 
Canadians' gift, they viewed it as just that, a gift, and not much more. The 
project did not involve them very deeply, nor did it otherwise change their 
lives. In fact, they seem to have been baffled by the whole experience. This 
is analyzed in more detail below.
Impact of Reconstruction Aid
A . Change in Housing Patterns
To review, the previously existing housing pattern in San Andres was as 
follows:
1. House design and construction was an individual family affair, 
guided by cultural and economic factors.
2. The most common structure was one-room, adobe-and-tile.
The earthquake added new factors which might have changed the pattern 
in the long-run; but since reconstruction aid arrived so soon, all we can 
state about the response is as follows:
1. House design and construction was still primarily an individual 
family affair with potential to become a community affair, guided 
by cultural, economic, and now, geophysical factors.
2. The most common structure was no longer viable; a new solution 
had to be found.
n With the arrival of C.I.D.A. aid, the original housing pattern was com­
pletely changed. Now,
1. House design and construction was a C.I.D.A. affair, guided by 
C.I.D.A. s own preset determinations about money, type of materials 
style of project, and time frame.
2. The most common structure was two-room, presswood-and-lamina.
What are the implications of this changed pattern? On one hand, it 
is c ear that the inhabitants still do not know what kind of structure is 
best in light of the new reality - the potential for destruction by earthquake
C.I.D.A. made the decision for them, without involving them in the design pro­
cess or even m  a discussion of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
s ructure they were given. They believe, on the whole, that the house is 
earthquake-resistant - but they are not sure wh^. Many of the respondents 
in the survey commented that they thought the new structure was safe because 
i was made of wood, but this is only in contrast to materials which they 
know are not safe - adobe and tile. They do not know that wood houses are 
e bes_t solution. On the positive side, each family in San Andres now had 
a house, even those who hadn't had one before. 30 Moreover, the houses were
30. Houses before the earthquake numbered 1,240 whereas 1,640 were built 
by C.I.D.A.
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all up within a few months of the disaster, much quicker than anyone had 
expected.
In fact, if other characteristics are taken into account, it seems clear 
that the C.I.D.A. houses are not the best solution. They are not, for example, 
as permanent or as well—insulated or as fireproof as the previous design. 
Moreover, they are made with materials which are not unavailable to the inhabi­
tants - they cannot be repaired or duplicated.
For those who have financial resources, the C.I.D.A. houses may last.
A few are reinforcing and protecting their houses with paint, cement founda­
tions and flooring, even brick or cement block walls around the sides. Some 
have covered the outside walls with adobe bricks. Others have walled in the 
outside corredor to expand the house.
However, in the opinion of the new mayor, some 50-60% of the town's 
population cannot afford to make improvements. Their plight is made more 
difficult by the higher cost of local building materials such as wood, lamina 
and cement blocks. One local albanil said the prices of these materials in 
general have gone up 100% since the earthquake.31
There is some indication that the local residents, with time, might 
have found a better solution on their own. One of the local albaniles, 
for example, was building additional houses in San Andres in November using 
half-adobe, half-wood design; the adobe rises only a meter high - not high 
enough to fall and crush anyone inside. The structure also uses well-sunk 
wood cornerposts and a lamina roof. Another albanil, at the time of the study, 
had organized a group to receive classes on asismic construction techniques 
using local materials, given by the OXFAM/World Neighbors Programa Kuchuba'l32 
in nearby Chimaltenango. There is also a good deal of new construction among 
the wealthier ladinos using cement blocks.
All of the materials being used by these builders are available locally. 
They are not as vulnerable to rot or fire as the C.I.D.A. materials, and they 
are likely to provide better insulation and greater permanence. But the 
biggest  ^difference is that they are being designed and built by the local 
population rather than by an outside group.
The possible effects of a people working together for a common solution 
to reconstruction in San Andres can never be evaluated because the responsi­
bility and the choice was taken out of their hands by the C.I.D.A. project.
This will be discussed below in the context of the changing social reality 
of San Andres.
3 • Social Change After Reconstruction Aid
As was brought out in the beginning section of this paper, San Andres 
efore the earthquake was a poor, ethnically-divided town making some initial 312
31. Vincente Zamora, see list of interviews, Appendix 2.
32. A program supported by donations from the United States and 
England.
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steps towards organization and social change. With the earthquake, the com­
munity experienced a social shock - it affected the entire population all at 
once, with similar effects. The community was now more than ever aware of 
its own poverty and confronted with the challenge of community organization 
and cooperation. The ladino municipality did, in fact, make a beginning in 
this direction, and at least one of the reformist groups mobilized itself for 
a community solution to the reconstruction dilemma. At the same time, there 
was a great deal of chaos and doubt. Where this process might have led is 
now impossible to say.
As was shown in the section on attitudes, most of the residents were 
greatly surprised by the arrival of C.I.D.A.'s reconstruction aid - indeed, 
"shocked" may be an appropriate word. To this day, most of them have no idea 
why tkey were chosen for such a gift. The aid, especially for the naturales, 
was totally unexpected.
Once they had verified that the aid was in fact a reality, they were even 
more surprised to hear that it was to be distributed equally among ladinos 
and naturales, on the basis of work rather than money or status. This had 
the effect of raising expectations among the naturales, giving them hope that 
for once they would be treated on a par with their wealthier neighbors.
The ideology of equality surprised the ladinos as well; it was not 
the pattern they expected. One ladino was caught stealing some of the project's 
lumber with the intention of selling it out of town. He was fined $600 and 
thrown in the departmental jail. It was the first time, at least for many
years, that a ladino from San Andres had been jailed.
Canadian Embassy officials, with the help of the University students, 
had set up an entirely new community organization for the delivery of aid.
In this way, it bypassed both the lad ino municipality and the natural reform
groups - two types of community organizations which might otherwise have 
played a significant role in the reconstruction of San Andres. This pitted 
the two against each other in competition for control over the reconstruction 
project. As it happened, the ladinos - who were better organized and better 
prepared to deal wTith C.I.D.A.'s ladino coordinator — took more control of 
the project and reaped a disproportionate share of its benefits. This made 
the natural leaders angry and disappointed, increasing the existing tension 
between ladinos and naturales.
To a large degree, the community organization by manzana and canton set 
up by the University students'3-3 was responsible for the positive attitude 
later exhibited by some of the natural leaders - that they themselves had re­
constructed the town through cooperation and hard work (and help from the 
Canadians). As was stated above, it gave them a role - however small - in 
community organizing and a concrete goal to achieve.
The factory system also helped stir an enthusiasm among the town's 
population, especially among natural leaders. It was a high-technology 
system, when compared to what was locally available. Through the use of 
trucks, electric saws, drills, lights, etc., the productive capacity of the 
community was greatly increased. They were awed by the speedy results of their
It should be remembered that the students took on this project 
on their own - it was not a C.I.D.A. idea.
23
own labor. This was. facilitated, too, by the number of expatriate volunteers 
who were familiar with such technology and the mass-production system.
Once again, the project had raised expectations; if such rapid and com­
prehensive solutions were possible in the realm of housing, why not in other 
areas such as community electricity or water systems? The Canadians had 
shown an explicit desire to help the naturales.es well as the ladinos; so had 
the volunteer groups who had worked with them; 34 it did not seem difficult to 
eleicit even further help from them if needed. The only obstacle, as far as 
the natural leaders were concerned, was the ladino establishment.
With the election of a natural as mayor in August, this obstacle was 
removed, or at least set back a step. As was mentioned in the section on 
attitudes above, the mayor has ambitious plans for improvements in San 
ndres - water systems; electricity; better roads; even an improved relationship 
between the urban center and the aldeas is on the schedule. As he said in an 
interview in October, 1976: "There is more unity than ever".
Only time can tell if the mayor's optimism is well-founded. However 
the study shows his (and other natural leaders') outlook. For example, in 
t e section on attitudes above, it was shown how little the general popu­
lation shared the enthusiasm of their leaders - most are still poor illit­
erate and univolved. The project did not improve their economic welfare 
nor did it provide them with any means of improving it.
Also, while the naturales have gained power in the municipality the 
tension between them and the ladinos has not necessarily ceased. A social 
worker in town has pointed out that the ladinos are still very much in con­
trol of the economic resources within the town. If this control is threatened 
m  any way, they will certainly react.
All nf°th T l r o i T W  iS the Style °f Problem-solving used by the natural leaders 
7  , T  Pr°Jects proposed by the mayor's committee are to be accomplished
rough donoai.ng agencies - some national, some expatriate. C.l D A itself
a wateV y 7 7  7  °f P ™ * ”*  -  belp San A n t e s 7  ha water system. The reformist community is organized to this end- to attract
accomplish^ 7 * ^  7  ^  ^  Pr<Wide the labor organisation necessary t o
her7 P h f l t a l  residtJtCt- td “  7  h°USlnS -construction project studied re, the local residents would not be involved in the planning stages.
Planning is a key issue, for we have seen in the case of r T n a -c 
t h o u s a n d T o f ^ j r  pro^e^  th^  the initial planning of aid - carried'out' ^  
construction 7 7 7 7 ^  " ^  ^  ^  « -
It is beyond the scope 
sider the opportunity cost 
have been accomplished with 
kind of solutions might the
of this paper, but nonetheless essential, to con 
of such elitist planning: what other uses might
the same resources? Or, put another way, what 
people of San Andres have come to on their own?
34. Plenty and the Apostles of Infinite Love 
stayed to live on land near San Andres, 
to have an impact on the community in the
are groups which have 
These groups may continue 
future.
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One thing is certain: as long as aid recipients are left out of the
planning process, as long as their decision-making power is kept reduced, 
there is no way of knowing what kind of solutions are best.
For the present time, San Andres is receiving a lot of aid from power­
ful, benevolent, outside groups. But what will happen when there is no aid 
agency to solve the community’s problems? What might happen if the power 
of the aid agencies is used for less charitable ends? These questions must 
be asked now, because a dependency is being created, a dependency on outside 
groups for the solutions to local problems.
C. Conclusion
Like the earthquake which prompted it, the intensive housing reconstruc­
tion aid given to San Andres was a social shock. It affected everyone in the 
town in a similar way and it came so quickly that the recipients had no time 
to t ink about it. It was a reality less than three weeks after the disaster
The aid s impact was contradictory: while it provided a house
family m  town, it destroyed the possibility for them to find their 
tion - one which might have been better in the long run. And, while 
helped promote the social reform movement in town, it restricted the 
y orienting it towards outside solutions.
for every 
own solu- 
it
movement
Because lt had shock value - it seemed to have no cause or origin- 
he aid was a deception. It deceived the recipients into thinking the houses 
they received were the best available, and that aid agencies have the only 
lutlons As the study has shown, there might have been other, better ways 
to approach the dilemma of permanent reconstruction - but, because C I D A 's 
aid was imposed as an answer, most people did not see altknaWves.
than l! th£ flnal analysis, the people of San Andres are no better prepared 
than they were before to find their own solutions to the problems which face
C°ntlnUe t0 aCCePt SOlUtl°nS outside groups ractions L  ° ™  caPacltles for doing so, may depend as much on the
tions of outsiders with power as it does on their own efforts.
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APPENDIX 1
Results of Survey of Inhabitants Selected Randomly (Sample size: 17)
Question 1 : 
Question 2 :
Question 3:
a .
b .
c .
Question 4:
Question 5: 
Question 6 :
Question 7
Question 8 
a
b.
c .
Question 9:
Question 10 
Question 11:
Question 12: 
First:
Are you the owner of the land on which house sits? 
Yes: 14 Owned by relative: 2 Rented: 1
How many people occupy the house?
Range: 2-7 Mean average: 5
House you lived in before the earthquake -- 
—  ° built it? We did: 3 Albanil did: 11 Don't know:
What materials? Adobe and tile: 9 Adobe and lamina:
How old was it? Range: 3-50 years Mean avera^iT
What did you live in after the earthquake?
Makeshift shack with sheets, nylon, or canvas: 12
^urlt rancho with cane, wood, lamina: 5
Did you trust the Canadians' promise to he1r>?
No: 12 Yes: 2 ~ -- " ~JL’
3
_  3 Both
16 years
No opinion: 3
10
you_(family) participate in the proiect?
Yes, had official role: 0 ’
Yes, worked in rubble-clearing and in factory:
Yes, sent relative to work: 3
No, paid someone else to work: 3
No, didn't have time: 1
What is your opinion of the proiect?
Good, find no faults: 10
Good, but there was injustice: 7
About the house you received —
Have you made any alterations? No: 
tile floor: 1 , painted walls:
wall: 3, added electricity: 3)
Anything wrong with house? It needs paint: 11
forcements: 1 it needs general care: 12
How long will the house last?
10-20 years: 2
20-40 years: 5
up to 50: 4
no idea: 6
If the Canadians hadn't helped, what would you have done?
„e • U Y  the same sltuatl01' (no permanent reconstruction) : 16
We might have begun some permanent reconstruction: 1
_y°Y,belong to any political, religious, or other association?
11 Yes: 6 (cement floor:
3, blocks or bricks on outside
It needs rein-
5,
Yes:
Did you receive any other emergency aid?
Yes: 11 (food: 11 blankets: 4 clothing:
No : 3)
Ou^_of__the following, what would you have listed as your first 
necessity after the quake? What ~--------  ------- ~
Housing . . . . Second:
Water . . 0 . .
Sewage . . o
Electricity . . 0 . .
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First: Second:
More land . . 0 .......... 0
Jobs........ 0 ............ 1
Other . . . .  0 .......... 0
No response: 8
Question 13: What is your occupation (head of household)? 
Agricultural: 11 
Small business: 1 
Other: 5
Question 14: Ethnic background? 
Natural: 11 
Ladino: 6
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APPENDIX 2
List of Persons Interviewed 
October - November 1976
Town Leaders
1* Manuel de Jesus Tala. Small businessman, evangelical leader. Natural.
2• Alfonso Can. Tailor/builder, evangelical leader, member of canton sub­
committee. Natural.
3. Francisco Arenales. Owner of La Experanza bus company. Ladino.
4* Hermelindo Azurdia. Cattle trader, president of first canton sub-committee. 
Ladino.
3. Jose Pedro Siquinajay. Mayor of San Andres (as of 7/76). Natural.
6 . Simon Hernandez Vasquez. Catechist, leader of "basic Christian community" 
(new Catholic group). Natural.
Felipe Herrera Chirix. Evangelical leader, president of second canton sub­
committee until replaced by Vincente Zamora (see below). Natural.
3* Pablo Tagual Tala. Agricultural worker, short-term member of emergency 
committee, member of canton sub-committee. Natural.
9- Vincente Zamora Silva. President of second canton sub-committeee, builder. 
Ladino.
10. Ku Samaj Junan (group interview). Canton Improvement Committee. Naturales.
H *  Carlos Cabrera. School director and teacher. President of Central Emergency 
(and Reconstruction) Committee. Ladino.
Outsiders
1* Luis Humberto Gonzalez Soto. Social Worker in charge of distributing materials 
to aldeas (villages) of San Andres.
2* Apostles of Infinite Love (group interview). Group of Priests from Quebec 
who ran factory in San Andres.
3" Reverend Ron Burke. North American Pastor of San Andres.
4 * Gustavo Porras. Professor from History Department, University of San Carlos, 
helped organize San Andres for reconstruction.
5. Dennis_Martin. Leader of Plenty, group from Tennnessee who built schools with 
Canadian materials.
6 . Bruce Wilson. C.I.D.A. Field Representative and Canadian Vice-Counsul.
7* Sergio Bucaro. Project coordinator, San Andres.
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APPENDIX 3 
Statistical Data
Population (before earthquake)
Urban center: 5,916
Rural areas: 2,531
Total: 8,447
Ethnicity
Natural (of Mayan descent): 2/3
Ladino (non-Mayan): 1/3
Earthquake's damage (February 4, 1976)
150 killed, 728 injured 
90% of structures destroyed
Number of Houses
Before earthquake: 1,240
Reconstructed: 1,640
Estimated costs of Project
0.2 million 
1.5 million 
1.7 million
San Andres - Rubble-clearing:
Construction materials: 
Total:
Total Emergency and Reconstruction Aid: 4.2 million
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APPENDIX 5
Methodological Note
Information for the study was collected through two types of interviews 
(see listing) and a survey of seventeen persons selected randomly. A Cak- 
chiquel research assistant aided in translating and clarifying the survey 
questions and information received. The research was conducted over a three- 
week period in October and November of 1976.
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